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COMMENTS
Finally, no fireman is liable for injury caused by an act or omission while
engaged in fire fighting.
Public health activities also come within the purview of this enactment.
The public entity is not liable for injuries caused by a policy decision
to prevent the spread of communicable disease, or for negligence in diag-
nosis or treating of disease with due care, as prescribed by medical au-
thorities. Furthermore, a public entity is not liable for decisions to con-
fine individuals for mental illness or addiction. Except for these provisions,
public hospitals and physicians in the public employ remain otherwise
liable for their acts.
The Act also sets out specific procedures for suits against public en-
tities. There is a one-year statute of limitations and a requirement that
notice, setting forth the parties and the particular facts of the claim,
must be served on the clerk of the public entity within six months. If
such notice is not served, the suit is barred. When liability is determined,
the act provides that settlement and compromise by the entity is permis-
sible. The entity may also insure itself. If the judgment is large enough
so as to impose undue hardship on the public entity, the act eases the
burden by allowing the judgment to be paid annually over a ten-year
period, with interest.
The public entity is also given authority to issue bonds to cover the
payment of outstanding tort judgments and to levy taxes to purchase
insurance. If the public entity derives revenue for the use of its facilities




RETENTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SETTLEMENT
The purpose of this comment is to determine whether the sovereign
immunity provision of the Constitution of Illinois should be retained in
its present form,' modified to some extent, or rejected completely. In its
present form, this section presents to the layman an absolute statement
of sovereign immunity. It also informs an attorney that claims against the
state may not be prosecuted in the courts of Illinois. As noted above, the
state is to a great degree responsible for claims against it.2 It would there-
1 ILL. CoNsT. art. IV, S 26: "The state of Illinois shall never be made defendant in
any court of law or equity."
2 See Comment, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 340 (1966).
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fore seem preferable that the constitution present to the nonprofessional
person a more realistic picture of state liability. As desirable as it may
seem to attain this result, a closer examination of this situation reveals
that the problem is not so simple, and certain basic issues of public policy
are involved. The first of these issues is whether the state should be liable
for claims against it,' and if so, to what degree. The question also arises
as to which branch of the state government, the legislative or the judicial,
should determine and define this liability.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY-TO WHAT EXTENT?
In Order to determine whether a state should be responsible for claims
against it, and to what degree, it is necessary to have an understanding
of the rationale behind the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This theory
traditionally has been based upon the precept that the King can do no
wrong-Rex non potest peccare.3 While this traditional maxim has often
been cited by the courts, in reality, -acceptance of the doctrine seems to
be based upon the contention that, due to fiscal and administrative con-
siderations, a sovereign which may be sued civilly, cannot govern effec-
tively.4 In practice, however, the riule is not treated as an absolute impedi-
ment to suits against the sovereign. The state legislatures and courts, as
well as the federal government, have so trimmed the ambit of this doc-
trine that the rule now seems to be sovereign responsibility, not sovereign
immunity, and today the majority of claims against governmental units
are paid. 5 The issue, therefore, is not whether the state should be liable,
but to what extent.
The problem of state immunity is centered in the area of tort liability.
This is due to the fact that the state, of necessity, must be responsible for
its contractual obligations. If this were not true, there would be a singular
unwillingness to enter into a binding relationship which only binds one
party. It is also obvious that a person does not consent to the commission
of a tort, while a contractual relationship is voluntarily assumed.
Perhaps the best method of ascertaining what is the proper amount of
sovereign responsibility, and whether Illinois has adequately shouldered
this burden, is to compare its liability to that of another selected jurisdic-
3 Note, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 914 (1953).
4 Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Note, 43
ORE. L. REV. 267, 269 (1964).
5 3 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. § 25.01 at 434 (1958 Supp. 1965): "Of all the de-
serving tort claims filed against federal, state and local governmental units, probably
far more are paid today than are unpaid, despite the persistence of the basic doctrine
that the sovereign cannot be sued without consent."- See also, Leflar & Kantrowitz,
Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1363 (1954).
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tion, as well as that degree of responsibility which the leading com-
mentators feel a sovereign should have imposed upon it. :
It is a basic concept underlying the whole law of torts today that liability
follows negligence, and that individuals and corporations are responsible for
the negligence of their agents and employees acting in the scope of their em-
ployment. The doctrine of governmental immunity runs counter to that basic
concept.6
The imposition of tort liability 7 serves two purposes; it compensates
the injured party, and serves to deter future tortious conduct." As de-
sirable as it may seem to attain these results, the question arises as to
whether the imposition of liability upon the state, predicated upon an
absolute standard of liability for negligent conduct, would impair the
ability of the state to perform the manifold services which are necessary to,
and demanded by, its citizens. If this question is answered in the affirma-
tive, and an absolute standard of liability based upon negligence would
shackle the state's performance of vital functions, then it must be realized
that this is not the proper criterion with which to determine a state's
liability.
In support of such open-end liability based upon negligence, the state-
ment is occasionally made that the state is in business, like a private cor-
poration, and therefore, it should consider liability for the negligence of
its officers, agents and employees as a necessary risk of operation. It is
contended that the state can adequately provide for such expenses through
taxation and liability insurance. While it is true that some of the activities
of the state overlap into the sphere Of private enterprise, it must be
recognized that, to a great extent, the functions of private and govern-
6 Molitor v. Kaneland Com. Unit Dist., 18 I1. 2d 11, 20, 163 N.E.2d 89, 93 (1959).
7 Liability in tort may be based upon one of two theories, the fault theory or the risk
theory. See David, Public Tort Liability Administration: Basic Conflicts and Prob-
lems, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 335 (1942). The fault theory is the rationale behind
the imposition of liability for negligent conduct. The risk theory imposes liability
without fault, as is exemplified by the various Workman's Compensation acts, and
seems to be gaining favor with some of the commentators as a basis with which to
impose tort liability on the state. See 3 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5 at § 25.17. Utilizing
this concept, it is argued that losses should be spread equally throughout the tax-
paying public as a price to be paid for the benefits received from society. The state
is the entity which creates the risk, and therefore, its beneficiaries should bear the re-
sponsibility. See Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign witbout Immunity,
36 So. CAL. L. REV. 161 (1963); Note 1964 Duxi L.J. 888 (1964). If the theory were
carried to its logical extreme, absolute liability could be imposed, even if the injured
person failed to exercise due care, or intentionally caused the injury. See Kennedy &
Lynch, id. at 177. If this were the case, the state's burden of liability could prove ex-
cessive, and therefore, "the usual proposal of American commentators is not that
governmental units should be absolutely liable, it is that liability should be imposed
for negligence or fault." 3 DAvIs, op. cit. supra note 5 at § 25.11 at 484.
8 See Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 7.
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mental entities are not similar, and for this reason, a similar basis should
not be used to impose liability.9 A private corporation does not zone
property, grant licenses, or provide courts; nor do they pass laws and
regulations which involuntarily bind the public. 10 This fact has been
recognized by the commentators and is one of the factors which has been
advanced to support the contention that a limited form of liability should
be imposed so as not to impede these uniquely governmental functions."
A further justification for a retention of some degree of sovereign im-
munity and a limited form of liability is the manner in which open-end
liability would effect governmental services. Many of the services ten-
dered by the state are inherently dangerous, and it is doubtful that a private
industry could carry them out.1 2 These functions are, in most cases, re-
quired by law, and could not be abandoned by the state if the burden of
liability proved to be excessive.' 3 It is highly doubtful that these activities
could ever be operated at a profit. Therefore, even if the state were able
to divest itself of these responsibilities, it seems inconceivable that a private
corporation could run these services at a cost in any way proportionate
to their public value.14 The state would be faced with a situation in which
it is exposed to a greater risk with less freedom of action; therefore, two
results would occur. The State would be forced to raise appreciably the
level of maintenance, supervision and services to a degree necessary to
reduce liability. A foreseeable result of this would be the taxpayer re-
ceiving much less for his tax dollar in the way of services. 15 Also, while
the state continues to operate these functions at a prohibitive cost, due
to the fact that they, by law, may not be curtailed, other nonobligatory
functions will have to be curtailed or eliminated. 16
While it must be agreed that open-ended liability would prove to be
too burdensome for the taxpayer, 17 attention must be turned to the con-
9 See 3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5 at S 25.17; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 7 at
166-67; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463 (1963).
10 See 3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5 at § 25.17; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 7 at
176-77.
11 Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 229 (1925); 3 DAVIS, Op. Cit.
supra note 5 at § 25.11; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 7.
12 See Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 7 at 177; Note, 6 ARIz. L. REV. 102 (1964).
13 Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 7 at 177.
14See Note, 1964 DUKE L.J. 888 (1964).
15 Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 7 at 178; Note, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 102 (1964).
16 Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 7; Van Alstyne, supra note 9 at 467.
'7 Note, 6 ARIz. L. REV. 102 (1964).
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tention that this problem can be resolved through the use of liability in-
surance. 18
[L]iability insurance is no new and untried device. We take judicial notice that
it serves private citizens and private corporatons as a means of prepaying just
the sort of unexpected burden with which we are dealing with in this case....
We do not ignore the fact that this decision . . . will, of course, occasion
some increase in the tax burden due to the purchase of insurance. 19
Two basic points have been overlooked by the proponents of liability
insurance as a method of financing the increased burden of open-ended
liability. The first problem would arise immediately upon removal of the
impediment of sovereign immunity. With no basis but conjecture with
which to estimate the increased potential liability of the state, it would
seem to be impossible to have the unknown risk underwritten at a
moderate cost. One result of the decision of the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona, completely abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity,20 was
the decision of the insurer of the City of Tucson to cancel the city's
public liability and property damage insurance.21 A more important point
is that liability insurance would cost the taxpayer more than self-assur-
ance by the state.
The argument will of course be made that the solution to this problem [the
impairment of government functions by open-ended liability] is simple and
that the government can carry insurance to protect itself against a high level
of liability as private industry does. This argument is usually made by per-
sons unacquainted with the cost of insurance premiums. In purchasing insur-
ance, one is in reality contracting for service. The insurance company antici-
pates making a profit from its business, and thus the cost of its services may
be greater than where the public agencies are self insured. Insurance premium
rates naturally depend on loss experience, and if a high degree of public lia-
bility is imposed on public agencies, the cost to taxpayers of insurance will be
correspondingly great.22
Thus, the complete removal of sovereign immunity would prove to
be an onerous burden for the taxpayer, regardless of the method used to
finance the increased liability of the state. The result would be either
higher taxation or a reduction of nonobligatory services. Total account-
ability would also impede the operation of uniquely governmental func-
tions to a degree disproportionate to the value of a program of complete
18 See Note, 43 OR.E. L. REv. 267, 269 (1964), wherein it is stated that "[insurance
may well prove to be an adequate means of ending government immunity without
endangering government finances."
19 Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 259, 111 N.W.2d 1, 24-25 (1961).
20 Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
21 Note, 6 ARiZ. L. REv. 102 (1964).
22 Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 7 at 178. See also, supra note 21.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
compensation based upon the theory of social justice.23 With these facts
in mind, it must be stated that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, in a
limited form, should be retained. The embodiment of this doctrine in
our constitution, through article IV, section 26, can therefore be con-
sidered merited, and retention of the section may be justified upon this
basis.
We have noted that the doctrine of state immunity must be limited
in its application. While the state cannot guarantee its citizens protection
against all risks, 24 it is obvious that there must be compensation of inno-
cent victims of torts committed by the state to the extent that the purely
governmental functions of the state are not jeopardized. If the sovereign
state employed the doctrine of state immunity as an absolute defense
against claims of a class which in no way imperiled vital state functions,
then no justification would exist for its incorporation in our constitution.
Sovereign responsibility must coexist with sovereign immunity, since one
nourishes the other.
Various standards and tests, such as the "governmental-proprietary" and
the "discretionary-ministerial" distinctions, have been applied in an at-
tempt to discern the proper limits of state liability. While it is beyond
the scope of this discussion to delve into these yardsticks, it should be
noted that they unfairly limit the sovereign's responsibility.25
In an effort properly to shoulder its burden of sovereign responsibility,
the State of New York has gone further than any other jurisdiction in
waiving sovereign immunity. 26 In its Court of Claims Act, the State of
New York completely waived its sovereign immunity and consented to
suit as if it were a private entity, 27 with a minor exception concerning
23 It is often stressed that social justice demands that the consequences of a tortious
injury suffered by an individual be shared equally by the citizenry, and should not
fall on victim alone. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Detroit, supra note 19. See also,
supra note 7.
243 DAVIS Op. cit. supra note 5 at S 25.11.
25 The "governmental-proprietary" distinction is usually only applied to subdivisions
of the states, the activities of the states themselves having been held to be govern-
mental, and therefore immune, in all jurisdictions except California and Texas. See
supra note 14. This distinction has proved to be confusing and very unsatisfactory. See
3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5 at 25.07. The "discretionary-ministerial" standard is
predicated upon the contention that if a public official were liable civilly for wrongs
committed in the course of a governmental function involving discretion, such as a
legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial activity, then fear of retaliation through civil suit
might outweigh sound discretion. See supra note 14. This classification is one of the
major exceptions in the Federal Tort Claims Act and has caused some confusion in its
application. See 3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5 at §§ 25.08-.10.
26 Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for "Purely Governmental" Func-
tions, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 30 (1958); Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 5.
27 N.Y. CT. CL. AcT S 8.
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torts committed by the militia. 28 While New York has gone further than
some commentators deem necessary to satisfy its sovereign responsibility 29
it is obvious that it meets even the most stringent standards set by other
commentators to gauge state accountability.30
At first glance, it would seem that the State of New York has, in ren-
dering itself completely liable, overcome the objections to total liability
previously raised in this discussion. While the State of New York is
liable as a private individual or corporation, and is therefore accountable
for the torts of its officers when it engages in activities in which private
individuals and corporations also engage,31 unlimited liability is not the
rule. In a discussion of the limits of state responsibility in New York,
it was noted that ". . . the state obviously performs a great many func-
tions which are not performed by private persons or corporations, and
according to their intrinsic nature could hardly be performed by such
persons. ' '3 2 The question therefore arose upon implication of the New
York Court of Claims Act as to what degree of liability, if any, should
be imposed upon the state where the function involved had no analogy
in private enterprise.33 This question has been answered by pointing out
that the New York Legislature was aware of the limitations of the analogy
between private individuals and the State, and therefore there was no
intent to impose liability for claims arising out of the operation of purely
governmental functions. 84 Under this theory of purely governmental
functions three specific areas of exemptions arose. The first of these im-
mune areas are legislative acts. It is held that an injury springing from
a legislative act is not actionable in spite of the fact that laws enacted
for the public welfare often produce private injury, due to the fact that
the government could not function if so hampered by civil actions.35
Judicial acts are also immune due to the fact that the state has no control
over the judiciary and therefore the doctrine of respondeat superior can-
not apply. Immunity is also predicated upon the need to preserve the in-
dependent operation of the judiciary, as well as the legislature.36 The
same rationale is used to extend immunity to administrative agencies which
28N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8-a (as added by Laws, 1953, c. 343).
29 See Kennedy & Lynch supra note 7 at 176-80.
30 See 3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5 at § 25.17.
31 Herzog, supra note 26.
82 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34Ibid.
35 Newiadony v. State, 276 App. Div. 59, 93 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1949); Herzog, supra note
26. In all cases where property is taken by legislative action, compensation must be
made as required by due process. Ibid.
36 Herzog, supra note 26.
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act in a quasi-judicial manner.37 These areas of immunity seem to fully
meet the standards set by the commentators.
88
The above survey of the thoughts of the commentators, as well as the
position of one of the most responsible jurisdictions, has determined the
extent to which a sovereign ought to be held accountable for its tortious
conduct. Possessing adequate standards, it is now possible to determine
whether Illinois is bearing its proper share of sovereign responsibility, or
employing the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a bar against valid
claims. As noted above, there can be no justification of the retention of
the doctrine if it is employed to frustrate valid claims against the state.
The language of article IV, section 26 seems to be absolute in its pro-
hibition of suits against the state; however, this section has been so
construed by the courts of Illinois to be rather narrow in application. 39
While this section is absolute, its ambit only encompasses suits against the
state itself; suits against those agencies of the state deemed to be integral
branches of a department of the state; and suits against state officers acting
within the scope of their authority and under color of a constitutional
statute.40 The enactment of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act exempted local public bodies, including
counties, from the ambit of the section, so as to further limit its applica-
tion.41 A suit which does not fall into one of the above categories is not
a suit against the state, and sovereign immunity does not act as a bar to
an action at law in the courts. 42
Due to the total proscription of suits against the sovereign, it has been
impossible to sue the state in the judicial system of Illinois; therefore,
soon after the adoption of the Constitution of 1870, the General Assembly
passed the first of a long series of acts which provided for administrative
tribunals to hear claims against the state and submit those thought to be
valid to the legislature.43 The current Court of Claims is the result of a
long series of such enactments. 44
The sole purpose of the Court of Claims is to hear claims against the
State of Illinois, as well as tort claims against the Medical Center Com-
mission, the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, Southern
Illinois University and the Board of Governors of State Colleges and
37 Id. at 35.
38 3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5 at §§ 25.13 and 25.15; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note
7 at 180.
39 See Comment, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 340 (1966).
40 Ibid.
41 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101-10-101 (1965).
42 See supra note 39. 43 I11. Laws 1877, at 64. 44 See supra note 39.
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Universities. 45 Its mechanical functions are set out in the Act and have
been discussed in the previous study. As a peripheral point, however, it
might be of interest to note the mechanical process of claims in the court.
All evidence is submitted at a hearing before a commissioner of the court.
The commissioner acts similarly to a master in chancery, in that he makes
a record of the hearing and files it, along with his recommendation, with
the court. Briefs may be filed with the court, and occasionally oral argu-
ment is allowed. The judges of the court, who in recent years have been
members of the Illinois Bar, consider all the evidence and make a deter-
mination. 46 The court closely follows the case law of Illinois, requiring
all of the elements of a cause of action before it will grant an award. 7
Provisions for a rehearing are set forth in the Act.48 However, there can
be no judicial review under the Administrative Review Act due to the con-
stitutional provision.49 Awards are then sent to the legislature where they
are approved as a matter of policy.50
The State of Illinois has long been a leader in the movement for the
assumption of a greater degree of sovereign responsibility.5' When the
Court of Claims acted at variance with the legislative desires and returned
to a strict theory of state immunity, and disallowed tort claims against
the state on the rationale that sovereign immunity precluded the appli-
cation of respondeat superior against the state,52 the legislature reacted
in clear and unequivocable terms by assuming liability for the negligent
acts of its officials, agents, and employees. This was accomplished by the
inclusion of section 439.8D in the 1945 Court of Claims Act. This sub-
section provides that in tort claims against the state "[t]he defense that
the State . . . is not liable for the negligence of its officers, agents, and
employees in the course of their employment shall not be applicable ......
While this section effectively reduced the Court of Claims to a mere
agency to determine the validity of tort claims upon their merits, it ac-
45 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8 (1965).
46 SPIEGEL, THE ILLINOIS COURT OF CLAIMS: A STUDY OF STATE LIABILITY 172-73 (1962).
47 33 I.L.P. State Government § 103 (1959, Supp. 1965); SPIEGEL, Op. Cit. supra note
46; Note, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 914 (1953).
48 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.15 (1965): "When a decision is rendered against a
claimant, the court may grant a new trial for any reason which, by the rules of com-
mon law or chancery in suits between individuals, would furnish sufficient grounds
for granting a new trial."
49 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1965). See supra note 3.
50 "It is the policy of the General Assembly to make no appropiation to pay any
claim against the State, cognizable by the court, unless an award therefore has been
made by the court." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.23 (1956). This policy is closely fol-
lowed. See, SPIEGEL, op. cit. supra note 46.
51 SPIEGEL, op. cit. supra note 46. 52 See supra note 39.
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complished much more. Because the state is 'liable to the extent provided
in the Court of Claims Act,55 it has, by making the doctrine of respondeat
superior applicable to itself, made Illinois a jurisdiction which satisfies
the highest standards of sovereign responsibility.
The reality of the situation is that the state, in applying the doctrine
of respondeat superior to itself, has waived the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, even if the negligence of the state employee occurred in the
course of a governmental function. 4
We have held that such Section [Section 439.8D] constitutes a complete waiver
by the State of its immunity from liability in tort for the negligent exercise
of a governmental function, and that the doctrine of respondeat superior can
be applied against respondent in an action based on negligence. 55
It is quite apparent that the state of Illinois is "claims conscious." The 1945
Act placed Illinois among the most advanced states with respect to the assump-
tion of liability, and the frequent enactments since that time (raising the limit
of recovery to $25,000) have in each instance further liberalized the state's
policy relative to the settlement of claims against it.56
Due to the fact that there are no exceptions to sovereign responsibility
in the Illinois law, as are found in the Federal Tort Claims Act,57 it can
truly be said that
[slince the passage of the Court of Claims Act in 1945, Illinois has made great
strides in the assumption of responsibility for state wrongs. Recent legislation
broadening the jurisdiction of the court of claims has, in that respect, virtually
put the Illinois system on a par with that of New York, which is generally
considered to have 'made the greatest advance in claims settlement in the
United States.58
By recourse to the standards of sovereign responsibility, which have
been previously developed, it can be seen that the State of Illinois is fair
and just in the settlement of claims against it. The doctrine of state
immunity is employed only to the extent'of placing a $25,000 limitation
upon recovery in tort claims, and to protect purely governmental func-
tions.59 With the above facts in mind, it can be stated that article IV,
section 26, with its embodiment of sovereign immunity, need not be
repealed or modified as an inequitable barrier to claims against the state.
53 33 I.L.P., supra note 47.
54 Ibid. See also, Herzog, supra note 26; Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 5.
55 Moore v. State, 21 111. Ct. Cl. 282, 284 (1951).
56 SPIEGEL, op. cit. supra note .46 at 84.
57Note, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 914, 918 (1953). Due to the nature of the Court of
Claims Act, the state is still immune in the areas of purely governmental activities;
that is, legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial functions.
58 SpIEGEL, op. cit. supra note 46 at 215.
59 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8D (1965).
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A LEGISLATIVE POLICY
CONSIDERATION
The State of Illinois is one of four states which has a. constitutional
provision which prohibits suits against the state.90 ,The Illinois Constitu-
tion provision, within'the limits discussed above, closes the courts of this
state to any claim in which the state is defendant. It is due to this fact
that the state of Illinois is; the only jurisdiction with an administrative
tribunal which hears claims against the state.6' Yet, Illinoisis one of the
most responsible jurisdictions in regard togsettlement of claims against it.
This seemingly paradoxical'situation gives rise to questioning the value
of retention of this ection. It is stated that this section does not mirror
the state's true responsibility for claims against it, and only serves to
confuse the layman. It should also be noted that the case law of Illinois
is used in the Court of Claims, and that the state .is largely suable in that
tribunal. Critics object -that the state should be sued tdirectly, rather than
by this circuitous method. These criticisms do not reflect a true under-
standing of the basic 'purpose.of this section, that is, the preservation of
the right of the legislature to set the public policy in regard to the limits
of sovereign responsibility.
As noted previously, 'the state cannot insure its citizens against all risks
which occur in the operation of the state government. In order to pre-
serve these functions, there must be limits: imposed on, the accountability
of the state. This is done: through recourse to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. A basic question then arises; should these limitations be set
and defined by the legislature or the judiciary? In Illinois, due to the
constitutional provision, the state cannot be brought before the bench.
Therefore, the question of the proper extent of state liability cannot be
raised and passed upon by the Illinois courts. Thus, the entire question
reposes with the legislature.
The extent of state liability is decided by balancing the public policy
of the need for unimpeded governmental services against the concepts of
tort liability, such as compensation for injuries.6 2 Due to, the fact that the
considerations involved ar6 political in nature, 'and therefore particularly
within the scope and experience of the legislature, this balancing process
is manifestly a legislative function. A determination of this policy entails
use of legislative machinery, to. undertake a comprehensive, study, and
60 ALA. CONST. art. I, S 14; ARK. CONST. art. V, S 20; ILL. CONST. art. IV, S 26; W.VA.
CONST. art. VI, § 35.
61 SPIEGEL, Op. cit. supra note 46 at 52.
62 Note, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 102, 108 (1950); supra note 14.
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this involves the formation of committees63 and hearings so that the
necessary facts may be acquired. 64 It is not possible for the courts to
balance such policy decisions on a case-by-case basis,65 and the courts
have, in the main, deferred to the legislature.66
While the courts have usually followed Justice Frankfurter's statement
that in determination of matters of public policy ". . . the clash of fact
and opinion should be resolved by the democratic process and not by the
judicial sword."67 There has been a growing national dissatisfaction with
the manner in which many jurisdictions have been applying the doctrine
of sovereign immunity." Within the past ten years the dam has burst and
many courts have taken it upon themselves to modify the position taken
by some states which, in the opinion of the court, has been the employ-
ment of sovereign immunity to frustrate valid claims against the state.
In the period from 1957 to the present, the courts in no less than thirteen
jurisdictions have either abolished sovereign immunity or have severely
restricted its application. 69 Most of these courts have avoided the criti-
cism of judicial legislation by stating that sovereign immunity is a court
created doctrine and ". . . judicial and not legislative action closed the
courtroom doors, and the same hand can, and in proper circumstances
should, reopen them."70 In the majority of these cases the immunity of
local governmental units was passed upon. 71 However, in one jurisdiction
the state was included within the scope of the decision which completely
abolished sovereign immunity. 72 In California, Illinois and Minnesota the
legislature reacted to the judicial modification of sovereign immunity
by statutory enactments which reestablished the doctrine.78
63 The Torts Law Commission of the State of Illinois, for instance, was created in
April 1961 by ILL. S. B. 229 (adopted August 21, 1961).
64 Van Alstyne, supra note 9; supra note 14. 65 Ibid.
66 The legislature, not the courts, ordinarily determines the public policy of the state.
See Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 256 Iowa 337, 127 N.W.2d 606,
612 (1964).
67 International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 478 (1950).
68 See supra note 14.
69 For a complete survey of these decisions see, 3 DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 5 at
§ 25.01.
70 McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 193, 162 A.2d 820, 832 (1960). See also,
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457
(1961); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Williams v.
City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev.
253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963).
71 3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5 at § 25.01.
72 Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
73 See supra note 14.
COMMENTS
Other courts, when faced with the opportunity of judicially abolishing
this public policy, have held that this remains a matter for the legislature,
and have refused to act.74 The legislative reaction to this judicial abroga-
tion has been noted by these courts in their refusal to abolish or modify
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. "All this confirms our view that
whatever is done to change the doctrine of governmental immunity should
be done by the legislature and not the courts. '75 "We think experience
in the few states where the court has attempted to abrogate the immunity
doctrine indicates legislative action is a better solution." 76
In 1959, the Supreme Court of Illinois joined the ranks of those courts
abolishing sovereign immunity. In the case of Molitor v. Kaneland Com-
munity Unit District, 7 the court was called to pass upon the immunity
of a school district for the negligence of its employees. The court expressly
overruled that immunity previously enjoyed by school districts and stated
that immunity in such cases is unjust, not supported by any valid reason,
and therefore has no place in modern society. The legislature reacted by
passing a variety of makeshift statutes to reaffirm the immunity of local
governmental units.78 A subsequent skirmish between the court and the
General Assembly took place when the court held a statute granting
immunity to park districts unconstitutional. 79 The legislature retaliated by
passing the Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act in 1965.80 The next round has not yet begun.
The Molitor decision is disturbing for a number of reasons. The lan-
guage is sweepingly broad, and there is no reason why it should not
apply to all governmental units in the state;8' and there is authority to
the effect that this decision has abrogated immunity to the extent of
governmental functions.8 2 Most disturbing, however, is the fact that the
74 Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, supra note 66; Nelson v. Maine
Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687 (1962); Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366
S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963); Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hospital, 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d
168 (1963); Vendrell v. School District, 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961). See also,
3 DAvis. op. cit. supra note 5 at § 25.01.
75 Fette v. City of St. Louis, supra note 74, at 448.
76 Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, supra note 66 at 342, 127 N.W.2d
at 609.
77 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
78 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34 S 301.1 (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 571, § 3a(1961); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 105, §§ 12.1-1-491 (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, § 333.2a (1961); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 122 §§ 821-831 (1961).
79 Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 111. 2d 60, 203 N...2d 573 (1964).
s0Supra note 41. 81 Note, 48 ILL. B.J. 549 (1959).
82 Peters v. Bellinger, 22 111. App. 2d 105, 159 N.E.2d 528 (1959).
